Five facts about the Golan Heights

Reuters

Israeli troops shot dead four people on its disputed border with Syria on Sunday, as protests by Palestinians to mark what they term “the catastrophe” of Israel’s founding in 1948, turned violent in numerous locations.

Israel’s border with Syria along the Golan Heights has been quiet for decades but on Sunday, for the first time in memory, protesters tore through the flimsy frontier fence at the Druze village of Majdal Shams.

Here are some facts about the Golan Heights, which stand at the heart of a long-standing conflict between Israel and Syria.

- The Golan Heights form a strategic plateau between Israel and Syria of about 1,200 square kilometres (460 square miles). Israel captured it in the 1967 Middle East war and annexed it in 1981 in a move not recognised internationally.

- Between 1967-2008 some 18,000 Israeli settlers had moved to the Golan, which also borders Jordan. Some 20,000 Druze Muslims also live there. Israel gave the Druze the option of citizenship though most rejected it. – Syria tried to regain the Golan Heights in the 1973 Middle East war, but the assault was thwarted. The two signed an armistice in 1974 and the Golan had been relatively quiet since. Syria is home to about 470,000 Palestinian refugees.

- The Golan contains important water sources and has further strategic value because it overlooks northeastern Israel including the Sea of Galilee, a tourist attraction and Israel’s biggest open reservoir.

- In 2000, Israel and Syria held their highest-level talks over a possible return of the Golan and a peace agreement. But the negotiations collapsed and subsequent talks, mediated by Turkey, also failed.

 

The Hidden History of the Balfour (4 )

“Services Rendered”

In his seminal work, Arab Awakening (1938), George Antonius points out that in early 1917 three major obstacles stood in the way of Zionist efforts to obtain a commitment from the British government in support of their goals in Palestine.¹⁹ First was the bargain concluded in 1915 with Sharif Husain of Arabia for an independent Arab state whose territory included Pales-tine. Second was the Sykes-Picot agreement, dividing the Middle East between Britain and France and placing the Holy Land under some sort of international administration. And third was the hostility toward political Zionism of an influential group of British Jews.

Antonius then continues:

“Undeterred, however, by those obstacles, Mr. Lloyd George appointed Sir Mark Sykes to open negotiations with the Zionists. What his motives were in wishing to come to an understanding with the Zionist leaders, and what the considerations were which induced the British Government eventually to issue the Balfour Declaration are questions to which the answers have been obscured by a smoke-screen of legend and propaganda. It is alleged, for instance, that the Jews used their financial and political influence to bring the United States into the War on the side of the Entente and that the Balfour Declaration was a reward for actual services rendered. All published evidence goes to disprove that allegation, and one can only infer either that it does not rest on any foundation or, if it does, that the services rendered by international Jewry in that connection were of so occult a nature that they have hitherto escaped the scrutiny of all the historians of America’s intervention.”

The initial meeting between Sykes and the Zionists took place on Feb. 7, 1917, and we can now see why the “services rendered” toward bringing America into the war have hitherto escaped the scrutiny of all the historians of America’s intervention. One would expect that Zionist actions aimed at bringing America into the war would have taken place sometime after the first British-Zionist meeting, but the first acknowledged contact between the British Government and Zionists was the Sykes meeting of Feb. 7, 1917. Yet by that time the Zionist contributions toward bringing America into the war already had largely been accomplished, although it is likely that Sykes himself was unaware of that.

The Balfour-Weizmann agreement of October 1916 was and remains entirely secret.

The Sykes meeting served as a sort of decoy.

In the few months between these two events, the following had taken place:

• The civilian head of codebreaking “Room 40” in London had been replaced by the director of Naval Intelligence.
• Von Jagow, who had served since 1913, was replaced by Zimmermann as German foreign secretary.
• Asquith, who had served as British prime minister since 1908, was removed from power, and a new War Cabinet was formed, in which Lloyd George was prime minister and Balfour foreign minister—both friends of Zionism since 1903.
• The key to German code 7500 was betrayed to Room 40.
• A draft of the ZT was concocted in London and presented to Zimmermann by one of his subordinates in Berlin.
• The ZT was transmitted by cable from Berlin to Washington on Jan. 16, 1917. It was copied by Room 40 and promptly de-coded. Note that this is incompatible with Tuchman’s story but entirely consistent with Dugdale’s account.

Thus, by the time of the Sykes-Zionist meeting of Feb. 7, 1917, the Zionist part of the bargain had been accomplished, and America was as good as at war. All that remained was for the British to find the best time and method for revealing the contents of the ZT to President Wilson and for him to convince Congress and the American people to go to war.

References:

1. Cornelius, John. “The Balfour Declaration and the Zimmermann Note,” The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs (WRMEA), Aug./Sept. 1997.
2. Cornelius, John. “Answering Critics of the Theory that Balfour Declaration Was Payoff for Zionist Services in WWI,” WRMEA, Sept. 1998.
3. Cornelius, John. “Palestine, the Balfour Declaration, and Why America Entered the Great War,” WRMEA, Oct./Nov. 1999.
4. Bernstorff, Count Johann Heinrich. My Three Years in America, New York: Scribner’s, 1920.
5. Dugdale, Mrs. Edgar. The Balfour Declaration-Origins and Background, London: The Jewish Agency for Palestine, 1940, pp. 15-16.
6. Weizmann, Chaim. Trial and Error, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1949, p. 152.
7. Rothschild, Miriam. Dear Lord Rothschild, Glenside, Pa.: Balaban Publishers, 1983, p. 341.
8. Bernstorff, pp.310-311.
9. Weizmann, p. 143.
10. Dugdale, Blanche. Arthur James Balfour, NY, Putnam’s, 1937, Vol. II, pp. 127-9.
11. Hendrick, Burton J. The Life and Letters of Walter H. Page, NY, Doubleday, Page & Co., 1925, Vol. III, Chap 14.
12. Howe, Russell Warren. WRMEA, Letters to the Editor, Jan./Feb. 1998, p. 110.
13. Link, Arthur S., Wilson, Vol. 5, Princeton, NJ, 1965, Princeton University Press, pp 433-5.
14. Hendrick, Vol. III.
15. Dugdale, Arthur James Balfour, Vol. II.
16. Friedman, William F. and Mendelsohn, Charles J. The Zimmermann Telegram of January 16, 1917 and its Cryptographic Background, Laguna Hills, CA: Aegean Park Press, 1994.
17. Tuchman, Barbara W. The Zimmermann Telegram. New York: Ballantine Books, 1958, 1966.
18. Kahn, David. The Codebreakers. New York: Macmillan, 1967, 1996
19. Antonius, George. The Arab Awakening. Philadelphia, NY: Lippencott, 1939.

John Cornelius is the nom de plume of an American with long-standing interest in the Middle East.

SIDEBARThree Versions of the Zimmermann TelegramZT-I as sent in code 7500 from Berlin to Washington on Jan. 16, 1917 Source: German HearingsTelegram No. 158.Strictly confidential.For your Excellency’s exclusively personal information and transmission to the Imperial Minister at Mexico by safe hands: Telegram No. 1. Absolutely confidential. To be personally deciphered. It is our purpose on the 1st of February to commence the unrestricted U-boat war. The attempt will be made to keep America neutral in spite of it all. In case we should not be successful in this, we propose Mexico an alliance upon the following terms: Joint conduct of war. Joint conclusion of peace. Ample financial support and an agreement on our part that Mexico shall gain back by conquest the territory lost by her at a prior period in Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona. Arrangement as to detail is entrusted to your Excellency. Your Excellency will make the above known to the President in strict confidence at the moment that war breaks out with the United States, and you will add the suggestion that Japan be requested to take part at once and that he simultaneously mediate between ourselves and Japan. Please inform the President that the unrestricted use of our U-boats now offers the prospect of forcing England to sue for peace in the course of a few months. Confirm receipt. ZIMMERMANN ZT-2 as sent in code 13042 from Washington to Mexico City on Jan. 19, 1917 Source: Friedman and Mendelsohn, translated from the German version The Foreign Office wires (telegraphiert) January 16: No. I. Absolutely confidential. To be personally deciphered. It is our purpose on the 1st of February to commence the unrestricted U-boat war. The attempt will be made to keep America neutral in spite of it all. In case we should not be successful in this, we propose Mexico an alliance upon the following terms: Joint conduct of war. Joint conclusion of peace. Ample financial support and an agreement on our part that Mexico shall gain back by conquest the territory lost by her at a prior period in Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona. Arrangement as to detail is entrusted to your Excellency. Your Excellency will make the above known to the President in strict confidence at the moment that war breaks out with the United States, and you will add the suggestion that Japan be requested to take part at once and that he simultaneously mediate between ourselves and Japan. Please inform the President that the unrestricted use of our U-boats now offers the prospect of forcing England to sue for peace in the course of a few months. Confirm receipt. ZIMMERMANN ZT-Hendrick, date unknown Source: Hendrick found among Ambassador Page’s papers Zimmermann to Bernstorff for Eckhardt W. 158. I6th January, 1917 Most secret for your Excellency’s personal information and to be handed on to the Imperial Minister in ? Mexico with Tel. No. 1…by a safe route. We purpose to begin on 1st February unrestricted submarine warfare. In doing so, however, we shall endeavor to keep America neutral….? If we do not (succeed in doing so) we propose to (? Mexico) an alliance upon the following basis: (joint) conduct of the war (joint) conclusion of peace Your Excellency should for the present inform the President secretly (that we expect) war with the U.S.A. (possibly) (…Japan) and at the same time to negotiate between us and Japan…(indecipherable sentence meaning please tell the President) that…our submarines…will compel England to peace in a few months. Acknowledge receipt. ZIMMERMANN SIDEBAR 2 Mr. Morgenthau Doesn’t Go to Istanbul A little known historical incident took place in the spring of 1917, shortly after the U.S. entered World War I on the side of the Allies. President Woodrow Wilson devised a plan for bringing about an early end to the war by detaching Turkey from the Central Powers. To this end, he sent a mission to Europe, where it was to meet with representatives of Britain and France in Switzerland and then make its way to Turkey. The mission was headed by Henry Morgenthau, Sr., who had been American ambassador to Turkey from 1912 to 1915 and had many contacts there. This story is related in Chapter 17 of Chaim Weizmann’s 1949 autobiography, Trial and Error. The American mission never arrived in Switzerland, let alone Turkey. In early June of 1917, Weizmann, who was then in London, received a cable from Louis Brandeis in the U.S., informing him of the mission and suggesting that he contact it. Weizmann immediately contacted members of the British government and learned the nature of the mission. Weizmann was concerned that the Morgenthau mission might result in the war ending with the Ottoman Empire still intact, eliminating the possibility of a Jewish state in Palestine. A subsequent conference with Lord Balfour lead to Weizmann’s being sent as the official British representative to meet with the American mission and a French representative. This meeting took place at Gibraltar after the American mission disembarked at Cadiz on July 4, 1917. Weizmann reports that he had no difficulty persuading Morgenthau to drop the whole matter, so instead of proceeding to Switzerland and Istanbul, Morgenthau went to Biarritz, in the South of France, where, he said, he would communicate with General Pershing and await further instructions from President Wilson. The Morgenthau mission was apparently secret, for Weizmann says he does not know how the story got out. He also says that in 1922, when Congress was looking into the merits of a Jewish homeland in Palestine, a senator stated that the leaders of the Zionist movement were unworthy men and that Weizmann, in particular, had prolonged the war for two years by scuttling the Morgenthau mission. Morgenthau seems to have shown more loyalty to Zionism than to his president or his country. Interestingly, author Barbara Tuchman was Morgenthau’s granddaughter.—J.C.